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Hypergaming for Cyber: Strategy for Gaming a Wicked
Problem
Joshua Sipper

Abstract
Cyber as a domain and battlespace coincides with the defined attributes of a
“wicked problem” with complexity and inter-domain interactions to spare. Since
its elevation to domain status, cyber has continued to defy many attempts to explain
its reach, importance, and fundamental definition. Corresponding to these
intricacies, cyber also presents many interlaced attributes with other information
related capabilities (IRCs), namely electromagnetic warfare (EW), information
operations (IO), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), within an
information warfare (IW) construct that serves to add to its multifaceted nature. In
this cyber analysis, the concept of hypergaming will be defined and discussed in
reference to its potential as a way to examine cyber as a discipline and domain, and
to explore how hypergaming can address cyber’s “wicked” nature from the
perspectives of decision making, modeling, operational research (OR), IO, and
finally IW. Finally, a cyber-centric hypergame model (CHM) will be presented.

Introduction
Hypergaming analysis as a tool for examining conflicts, situations, and constructs
has been used liberally throughout numerous environments for decades. Its
flexibility and applicability in military, government, business, education, and
virtually all other organizational settings has made hypergaming a tool that some
find indispensable. This is mostly due to the immersive and complex landscape of
hypergames.
“Hypergames are games in which the respective
adversaries (players) may not be fully aware of the
nature of the engagement they are participating in, or
indeed that they are actually participating in an
engagement.” i
The blind locale of hypergaming sets the stage for meta-cognition in ways
that other game theory associated analysis tools cannot. This is due to the broaching
of numerous unknown realities and meta-realities present within the hypergame
construct. It is especially useful in gaming for disciplines like cyber since there are
so many meta-realities and situations in the cyber domain where the unknown is
the reality. Attribution is one such unknown in which cyber has conceptual and
practical shortfalls. This being said, the shortfall in this instance is not just a side
issue, but a fundamentally “wicked problem” since it falls directly center of the
heart of Sun Tzu’s admonition to “know your enemy.” Several other such problems
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exist in cyber as well such as sovereignty, influence, deterrence, and a plethora of
others that can benefit from hypergame analysis.
Within the scope of this discussion, several areas attuned to hypergame
analysis for cyber will be examined. Decision making is an area not specific to the
cyber discipline, however, many very complicated and confusing problems arise
within cyber operations and warfare that require making decisions that are not
always completely positive or negative. Such dilemmas are common in cyber,
especially when attribution and deterrence are involved. Modeling is another tool
often used to analyze diverse problems in an array of organizations. Modeling for
cyber can be useful, especially when coupled with hypergaming. The combined
effectuality of modeling through the use of hypergames creates a deep and richly
textured canvas of opportunity for problem discovery, analysis, and resolution.
Operational research (OR) uses gaming and specifically hypergaming to peer into
the far reaches of the seemingly infinite matrix of operational problems extant
across military and government organizations. Cyber operations are well suited to
receive similar analytical rigor as they are characterized by fluid and elaborate
situations. Information operations (IO) is a discipline conjoined to cyber within the
IW framework. Its closeness and relationship as an IRC makes IO a prime candidate
for analytical expression through hypergaming. Analysis of IO within the cyber
scaffold will give a deeper look into how the same principles can be applied to
cyber and within greater cyber/IO influence and psychological operations.
Information Warfare (IW) has been examined multiple times using various types
of gaming constructs. However, hypergame analysis offers a profound and
multidimensional method for delving into IW in ways inexpressible through other
games.
Prior to the individual perspectives concerning hypergaming for cyber,
hypergaming itself will be examined and defined in relation to cyber. The purpose
of this explanatory section is to prepare the reader and potential user of
hypergaming for cyber with knowledge pertaining to how hypergaming works,
some basic principles and theory, and how cyber as a discipline and domain might
benefit from hypergame analysis. Following the hypergaming for cyber
exploration, each section will expand upon this concept and purport a cyber-centric
methodology for hypergaming, presented as a model in the final section.

Hypergaming for Cyber
Cyber as a discipline has its roots spread out in many directions between
information technology, information assurance, network security, information
operations, and many other areas involving the use of technology for offensive
cyber operations (OCO), defensive cyber operations (DCO), and cyber network
exploitation (CNE). However, the common rhizome among all of cyber’s capillary
reach is the concept of guiding, vectoring, and manipulating information to create
effects. The cyber concept originates in the Greek term kybernete associated with
piloting, governing, or steering a boat. This term was later adapted and used to coin
the term “cybernetics” which is the practice of piloting or steering information
through systems. Papamichail, et. al., reference cybernetics when discussing
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decision making in their paper regarding problem structuring methods (PSM), an
area of direct applicability to the cyber discipline, especially in relation to
hypergaming analysisii. Cyber as an information piloting discipline contains innate,
vast complexity such that simple models of gaming only graze the surface of its
ultimate operational potential. This makes hypergaming a potentially good fit for
analyzing cyber and seeking out its prolific extensions into every domain and
construct in the modern world.
“[T]here is an advantage to using cognitive
operations together with cyber operations. Actions
taken in the spheres of cognitive and cyber
operations have to be well planned, prepared, and
coordinated.” iii
This crossing of disciplines within only a binary construct presents complex
alternative capabilities and decisions that outstrip many analytical tools. However,
through the use of hypergaming, these potentialities may be identified, planned,
prepared, and coordinated.
Hypergaming for cyber is, in practical terms, an analysis of the various
problems encountered within the overarching cyber meta-reality; a reality about
realities. The accompanying and pervasive layers of information and systems
associated with the cyber domain require a multi-layered and consistently scalable
analysis methodology.
“In practical terms, players in hypergames have
perceptions of the engagement which may not reflect
the true nature of the engagement, resulting in
decisions and outcomes which may not reflect the
interests or indeed intent of the players.” iv
The multilayered and organic growth of situational play within cyber
hypergames allows for exploration of the unknowns and generates situations that
must be handled through judgment and decision making that is more realistic and
exploratory. In general, many other game types such as exercises might create
situations through scenarios and vignettes that point to making one or two decisions
regarding one or two problems. The ultimate point of the cyber hypergame
construct, however, is to force players to recognize not just what they can know,
but what they do not know, leading to a deeper cognitive understanding of decision
making and creative, constructive thinking. One might liken hypergaming to the
popular board game Clue™ (although this game is technically considered a game
with incomplete information), wherein players know only a few bits of information
about what the game is and who the players are, but they are missing the pertinent
information concerning how to actually win the game. The object then is to discover
what you as a player do not know.
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This is further described in four tenets of hypergaming:
“1. Players may have false perceptions of the intent
or aims of the other players; 2. Players may not
understand the choices available to other players; 3.
Players may not know who other players in the game
may be; 4. A player may be subject to one or more of
the previous misperceptions of the game.” v
Thus, hypergaming is like Clue™, but without knowing it is a murder
mystery game, the characters, the murder weapons, the locations, or even the fact
that you are playing a game against other players at all or even who the other players
may be!
Interestingly, Zwicker in his analysis of the nature of hypergaming came to
an enlightening conclusion about what hypergaming really is, or is not. Zwicker
discovered what he terms the “Hypergame Paradox” which led him to determine
that hypergames actually are not games at all. He determined this by applying a
definition of what a game is connoted by five criteria:
“(1) Two players, I and II, move alternately, I going
first. Each has complete knowledge of the other's
moves. (2) There is no chance involved. (3) There are
no ties (when a play of G is complete, there is one
winner). (4) Every play ends after finitely many
moves. (5) At any point in a play of G, there are but
finitely many legal possibilities for the next move.” vi
However, Zwicker found that number five in the list could not be satisfied
by the hypergame construct and therefore hypergames could not be games. The
most interesting piece of this discussion isn’t really whether or not hypergames are
games, but the fact that Zwicker established a mathematical proof for infinite
“legal” moves within any given hypergame; a compelling corollary for cyber
operations and cyber warfare in the current environment of at least apparent infinite
cyber possibilities.
Regardless of its status as a game by any definition, hypergaming appears
to suit cyber domain analysis well in that cyber presents numerous problems,
intractable through traditional gaming methodologies. This is not to say that other
gaming, exercises, or analysis methods are of no value. Quite the contrary, there
are many advantages to examining components of the cyber domain and cyber
operations and warfare. However, if one wishes to see a full spectrum, holistic view
of cyber through a multilayered and organic lens, hypergaming is potentially a
better fit, especially considering the power held in computer modeling, artificial
intelligence (AI), and machine learning (ML).

Cyber Hypergaming and Decision Making
Cyber, as any complex discipline, includes multiple situations in which a dizzying
array of decision paths are available. Decision making is a common, difficult
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occurrence within cyber that carries with it the potential to create untold second and
third order effects. Therefore, courses of action (COA) must be considered
carefully. But, it is vitally important to understand that COAs cannot be made or
taken in a vacuum. In fact, many information sources pour into the development of
COAs including cyber, ISR, IO, and EW, not to mention considerations from other
domains of warfare. With this rich and often overwhelming flow of data,
developing a COA can be daunting, if not impossible.
“In game-theoretic analyses it is usually supposed
that all participants are well-informed of the game
being played, i.e. of each other's aims and options.
This is clearly an invalid supposition for most
interesting real-world conflicts and even for
games… in which players are presented with a
common game matrix. The fact that decision makers
may have radically differing views of the world has
been shown to crucially affect the decisions.” vii
This is where hypergaming can bridge the supposition and assumption gap to assist
decision makers in understanding a much wider array of possibilities. Fictionalized
or even real-world scenarios, dilemmas, and case studies can only go so far,
however with the augmentation of hypergaming, unexpected situations and
unknowns can inject a real-world caste that would otherwise be missing.
“The use of game theory to analyze military
operations is not new… [I]t is only natural that we
examine its applicability to…friendly-enemy
interaction analysis. One advantage of using game
theory is that the mental process involved in
determining the payoffs forces us to assess enemy
objectives.” viii
Enemy objectives, obvious or obscured, are always difficult to follow to
their end. While hypergames might not discover every possibility, they do offer a
way to explore more possibilities within a cyber medium of understanding than if
only a few aspects were considered.
Another area to keep in mind in reference to decision making for cyber
while implementing hypergame analysis is the characterization of cyber as a
“wicked problem.”
“In today's competitive environments, managers are
increasingly faced with 'wicked' problems or
messes… Solving wicked problems may cause or
worsen other inter- connected problems.” ix
Hypergames present another advantage in light of the “wicked problem”
difficulty in that hypergames do not necessarily seek to “fix” the problem, but to
analyze the problem, thus sidestepping potential second and third order effects
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caused by disconnecting as a result of procedural, pedagogical, or philosophical
displacement.
Hypergaming also coincides with the problem solving and decision-making
process of hypermapping. “[The] concept of a hypermap provides a novel way of
linking elements of cognitive maps and hypergames.” x Cognitive mapping is a
technique used in numerous fields of study and institutions to present patterns of
thought for processes, problem resolution, and reasoning. Hypermapping plays the
cognitive mapping method alongside hypergaming to give participants a way to
generate possible actions and reactions in the process of playing the game.
“[T]here is a set of modelling methods with a good
deal of theoretical basis in common hypergame
analysis, also developed from game theory. Apart
from hypergame analysis itself, this conceptual
'stream' includes the analysis of options
methodology.” xi
Through analyzing the various COAs possible through hypermapping,
players can get a much richer experience and better feel for how cyber operations
might actually develop in a real world circumstance.

Modeling for Cyber Hypergames
Modeling has deep roots in military and cyber science applications as this method
has been proven as a useful tool for virtually experiencing surprising and
unexpected situations within a controlled experimental environment. Modelling is
extremely useful when examining the potential conflicts that will invariably arise
as cyber operations and warfare progress between two or more entities.
“Game models are intended to provide an analytical
guide through this maze. There are various ways of
representing a game, perhaps the most intuitive being
as a tree of moves, in which each branch, or move, is
under the control of a particular player, and the
moves available at any point may depend on those
already made. One can visualize the game of chess,
for example, as a fantastically-complicated tree of
possible moves.” xii
The extensive form model depicted by the complex tree view is just one of
many possible ways to look at a hypergame model, although there is likely no
model in existence that could fully contain the potentially infinite possibilities of
the hypergame construct.
Hypergame models invariably take on a life of their own, growing and
branching in many unexpected directions with decision trees taking on the
resemblance of a forest. While this tendency can serve to overwhelm many players
within a cyber hypergame, the point is not to apply stress and go for a resolution as
it is to learn and grow through the hypergame. A cyber hypergame can metastasize
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in various ways, “including the existence of 'games within games.' Such problemstructuring is not incorporated into formal analysis, but form a general backdrop
against which analysis of specific interactions can proceed.”xiii The cyber
hypergame is then a proscenium stage, set within the vignettes of numerous cyberrelated interactions such as OCO, DCO, CNE, ISR, EW, IO, and a host of other
operations, security, political, and social climes. In any event, hypergames are
iterative and tend to sprout into new and different shoots of possibility.
“In terms of the games being played… any
subsequent hypergame analysis must be able to
handle a network of games rather than those
occurring in isolation.” xiv
This again is where the cyber strengths of computer modeling and processing with
AI and ML are of great utility.
One final modeling technique that potentially finds purchase in cyber
hypergaming is dynamic modeling.
“It is necessary to use a dynamic model for games
where there are constraints on players' actions as
time passes. The state transition form takes the
results … and incorporates them into a structure
which permits the inclusion of new information
relating dynamic constraints.” xv
The use of dynamic modeling not only serves to delimit the game so as to
now allow too much information travel or time lapse. This can be very helpful in
classroom environments or other areas where time may be a factor. Overall, the
concept of modeling for cyber hypergames generates a formula for control and
bordering that assists in guiding the flow of the hypergame, allowing players to
make more reasoned decisions.

Operational Research and Cyber Hypergames
The field of operational research (OR) has long been a mainstay of innovation as
relates to understanding how information morphs and flows through organizations
and systems. Within the cyber domain, operational research is of paramount
importance for the obvious fact that information is the guiding and primary trade.
Of course, where there is information there are also many different interpretations
and views of that information that must be explored. While this can be a problem
if conflicts are allowed to fester, the use of hypergame analysis can be of great help
from an operational analysis perspective.
“Many decision problems involve conflicts of
interest between different participants. An effort has
been made to develop hypergame analysis as one
way of modelling such situations. Specifically this
approach is designed to allow for the fact that the
various parties may have quite different beliefs about
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the situation-including different models of each
other.” xvi
As decisions within a cyber operational construct become more and more
complex, divergent views of everything from strategic purpose to fine-grained
tactical choices can become problematic. Through the use of hypergame analysis,
conflicts and different interpretations of information can be explored and mitigated
within an experimental framework.
“Examination of conflicts … in warfare, reveals a
host of cases in which the parties appear to have quite
disparate ideas of what the situation is, what the real
issues are, and what each other's aims and possible
actions may be. Hypergame analysis was conceived
as a possible means of exploring and analyzing this
sort of situation.” xvii
As disparate interactions flow through the hypergame analysis, perceptions
and flex points become more visible and open to discussion and optimization. This
is the crux of hypergame analysis for cyber.
OR can be particularly constructive in areas where massive amounts of data
are matriculated. This is a common problem within the cyber domain since so much
information is available, indeed usually too much. In these cases, information
databases and aids can be of enormous practical assistance for sorting, binning, and
further analyzing massive amounts of information regarding the cyber information
environment (IE).
“Such varied use of IT is perhaps a good reflection
of current practice, where there is evidence of webbased decision support systems, the use of
organizational databases and systems, the use of
specialist software such as [specialist] software
through to instances of low-IT use, for example, in
the workshop environment.” xviii
Fortunately, a great deal of technological aids exist to assist in computer
modeling for hypergames as well as parsing and organizing the results of analysis,
which can sometimes be quite prodigious.

Information Operations and Cyber Hypergaming
Information operations (IO) like cyber is considered an IRC; one with astonishing
reach and influence. In fact, IO is one of four IRCs considered to be a discipline
within the IW construct along with cyber, ISR, and EW. This fact along with the
inborn nature of IO as an information rich discipline gives further impetus to the
benefits it might harvest from hypergame analysis. Cyber hypergaming conjoined
with IO exponentially increases the benefits of the analysis endpoints as areas
inherent to both disciplines can be examined and exploited. “[R]esearchers and
analysts have noted the ability of hypergame analysis to model deception and
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surprise.” xix The use of information to influence and mold adversary responses is
a key methodology within IO and cyber. Whoever controls the information,
controls the battlespace. This is useful not only for ongoing operations, but for
influence outside the boundaries of conflict.
“Hypergame analysis seems to provide one
reasonably efficient method of generating and
exploring different hypotheses about the reasons for
other peoples' behavior, the predictions of which can
then be compared.” xx
The author goes on to specify deterrence as an example; an area of particular
interest within cyber, IO, and IW. The overriding concept is that hypergame
analysis is a valuable tool for understanding and predicting adversary behavior,
which is the pinnacle of power in IO.
Another important aspect of cyber and IO information theory revolves
around the concept of information superiority. On the battlefield, the one who has
the most information is the one who will most likely prevail. This is a tenet of
warfare known from ancient times and has not changed since. As hypergame
analysis deals with information, how that information is perceived and used, and
how to better construct understandings of information, this exercise has great
potential in making way toward information superiority. Bracken and Darilek, in
their paper regarding information superiority and game theory, propose the
following analysis,
“To address the question of how much information
might be required for US forces to achieve
superiority, we have drawn upon game theory as a
methodology that looks to be directly relevant to
such questions.” xxi
In their game model, they find that the “payoff” for either side in the game
is highly sensitive to the information of both sides. That is to say, as each participant
gains more knowledge of the information pertaining to the other participant, the
game itself, and the reactions of the other participant, the more power and influence
they garner. This works well with the concept of information theory to be explored
later. The end analysis comes down to the apparent ability of one to claim and hold
superiority within the cyber and IO battlespace based on the available and
controlled information at their disposal.

Information Warfare and Cyber Hypergaming
Information warfare (IW) has surged of late as an important and allencompassing strategy encapsulating the cyber IO, EW, and ISR disciplines and
with this corralling of capabilities bringing great complexity. With this convolution
comes the need to analyze information and its flow and intricacies. Hypergaming
offers a structure for analysis that allows many differing vistas, potentially
disaggregating the information river into tributaries. “In information warfare the
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fundamental weapon and target is information, while the main goal is information
superiority.” xxii Information is key to the discussion and operations of IW, but it
also can be a barrier to understanding as it is often an avalanche of sometimes
disparate, singular bits.
A large portion of IW is focused on controlling information and using it to
influence other players within the IE. In cyber and IW hypergaming, this method
of control is often used in producing COAs.
“COAs are, for the most part, based on intelligence
and information provided by various Situational
Awareness (SA) systems, weapons systems, and the
like. Thus, decision-making processes rely heavily
on collection of data that is purposeful, correct, and
timely.” xxiii
This information and the associated decision-making processes are related
directly to what is referred to as reflexive control (RC), a method of using
information to manipulate adversaries and other participants in IW and cyber
conflicts as well as daily operations.
“RC can be defined as ‘a means of conveying to a
partner or an adversary specially prepared
information to incline him to voluntarily make the
predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the
action’ (Thomas 2004). The essence of a ‘reflexive
game’ … is found in the mutual attempts of the
adversaries to impose RC over one another.” xxiv
The “reflexive game” is related to cyber hypergaming in that cyber is often
used within the IW construct to guide and pilot information such that the adversary
makes movements and decisions in favor of US and allied interests. Also, both
groups attempt to apply RC and are often unaware that this is what is happening,
further relating to the hypergame philosophy of unknown and incomplete
information.
“Information age warfare is characterized by rapid
evolution, and all indications at this stage are that the
capacity for lateral evolution will prove by far more
important than the capacity for linear evolution.
Opponents faced with overwhelming technological
superiority which they cannot beat in a head-to-head
contest of engineering and scientific skills will
devise new and different ways of competing.” xxv
This reality has been borne out with countries like Russia and NGOs such
as ISIS developing low-cost, high-impact methods for manipulating information
that has imposed costs on the US and its allies at many turns economically,
politically, and societally. Cyber hypergaming can reach into this issue by modeling
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and analyzing the possibilities of adversaries’ attempts to find ways of imposing
costs that were not intuitively obvious. Explorations in the power of social media
to manipulate and degrade information such that integral, cultural and societal
values such as elections are disrupted are just one example of adversaries imposing
costs through IW. This type of information control and degradation happens often
and in interesting ways within the cyber battlespace.
“Denial of information or degradation strategies
offer a large payoff in that the opponent is denied
both warning and targeting information, significantly
complicating any attempt to mount a defense.” xxvi
The opportunity to discover these types of denial, degradation, and
destruction methodologies within the safe and controlled space of cyber
hypergaming offers a way to see the many and varied possibilities a cyber warrior
might encounter within the interconnected and complex IW sphere.
Probably the best example of modeling IW with hypergaming was
established by Kopp (2003) in his application of Shannon’s Information Theory
concept to hypergaming. Claude Shannon developed his mathematical theory of
information in 1948, drawing on the concept of binary logic which developed
eventually into computer programming logic, earning Shannon the title of “Father
of Information Theory.” His concepts are directly applicable to many concepts
within cyber and EW specifically as he looked at how information is transferred
across a channel where interference (i.e.., noise) was present, building on the
physical waveform experience of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Kopp took this
concept and further extended it into four canonical offensive IW strategies: “Denial
of Information (‘Degradation or Destruction’ per US DoD), Deception and
Mimicry (‘Corruption’ per US DoD), Disruption and Destruction (‘Denial - Form
1’ per US DoD), and Subversion (‘Denial - Form 2’ per US DoD)”xxvii. With this
concept firmly established, hypergaming was applied and a model was fashioned
to depict how these four IW strategies could be analyze within the hypergame
construct. In the following section, the same model will be applied to introduce a
model of cyber hypergaming, building from Shannon’s and Kopp’s concepts of
information theory and hypergaming.

The Cyber Hypergame Model (CHM)
Before a model for cyber hypergames based on the four canonical IW
strategies can be laid down, a general understanding of hypergaming as a construct
must be presented. In Figure 1, a simple model is presented showing the difference
between a game and hypergame. As Kopp explains:
“In a hypergame the players perceive their
opponents’ games. How accurate that perception
might be depends on the information available to
respective players. Inaccurate information leads to a
misperception of the game state and may lead to
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actions which do not gain the player an advantage.”
xxviii

Figure 1. Hypergame General Model (Kopp, 2003)

This is where the methods of cyber and IW methods begin to emerge, with denial,
deception, degradation, and destruction being used through RC and other IW
techniques.
For the examples of the four cyber strategies within the cyber domain,
Figure 2 depicts scenarios in which a denial of information, deception and mimicry,
disruption and destruction, or subversion might occur.
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Figure 2. Contemporary examples of the four canonical offensive Information Warfare
strategies in the Cyber domain
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In the above examples, information is manipulated and obscured such that
the adversary in the game cannot control the information. Through control of the
data and information, the four canonical IW strategies are demonstrated for a cyber
hypergame construct. Now this concept must be applied to the prosecution of a
game using the four strategies, shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Hypergame models for the four canonical Information Warfare strategies,
(Kopp, 2003).

The four strategies are depicted using the information flow concept to
indicate how information is denied, degraded, disrupted, or destroyed within each
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strategic construct. The full complement of the cyber hypergame concept can be
used to great effect for analysis of numerous types of cyber operations. This
analysis focuses primarily on the OCO aspect with some DCO and CNE
augmentations. However, the concept can be applied using information theory
across the full spectrum of cyber and IW.

Conclusion
The cyber domain is one of extreme complexity and interconnections due
to its role as a central IRC, sustaining the flow of information for every other
domain of warfare as well as the other IRCs associated within the IW construct. As
a result, virtually infinite decisions can be made, multiplying possible COAs and
complicating operations within cyber, IW, and multi-domain operations (MDO).
All of this incredibly fluid and constant movement of information, requirements,
and operational shuffle call for a methodology for analysis that could be assisted
through the use of hypergaming. Hypergame analysis is a powerful tool, capable of
allowing its players to see intricacies and unexpected possibilities they might not
perceive otherwise. Through the use of the Cyber Hypergaming Model, cyber
warriors have the opportunity to delve more deeply into the understanding of the
IE and how to more accurately and specifically construct COAs for use in the cyber
domain, IW, and MDO.
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